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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises from the entry of an order of 
removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B).
1
  An Immigration 
                                              
1
 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) renders deportable "[a]ny 
alien who is present in the United States in violation of this 
chapter or any other law of the United States, or whose 
nonimmigrant visa (or other documentation authorizing 
admission into the United States as a nonimmigrant) has been 
revoked under section 1201(i) of this title." 
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Judge ("IJ") found petitioner removable and ineligible for 
cancellation of removal, and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals ("BIA") affirmed.  Petitioner concedes removability 
under § 1227(a)(1)(B), but contests the adverse determination 
of his eligibility for cancellation of removal.  Because 
petitioner has failed to meet his statutorily prescribed burden 
of demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal, we will 
affirm.   
I.  Facts & Procedural Background 
Petitioner Damian A. Syblis, a native and citizen of 
Jamaica, entered the United States on May 9, 2000 as a non-
immigrant visitor.  Pursuant to his visa status, Syblis was 
authorized to remain in the United States for a temporary 
period not to exceed three months.  Despite this limitation, he 
remained in the United States beyond three months without 
seeking additional authorization.   
Syblis's contact with the law began on July 31, 2004, 
when he was charged with possession of marijuana, in 
violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250.1.  The charges were 
later amended, for unknown reasons, to possession of drug 
paraphernalia, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466.  He 
was convicted on November 30, 2004 of the amended charge.   
On March 27, 2008, in a matter unrelated to the 2004 
incident, Syblis was convicted of possession of marijuana, in 
violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250.1.   
Thereafter, on July 19, 2010, the United States 
Department of Homeland Security initiated removal 
proceedings against Syblis, charging him with removability 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his visa 
  
5 
authorization, and pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)
2
 
for his paraphernalia and marijuana convictions.  Appearing 
before an IJ on April 14, 2011, Syblis conceded removability 
on the grounds that he had overstayed his visa; however, he 
contested his removability on the grounds that he was 
convicted of an offense relating to a controlled substance.  
During that time, Syblis also renewed a previous application 
for an adjustment of status, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
245.2(a)(5)(ii), and requested a waiver of criminal 
inadmissibility grounds, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
3
 
On June 16, 2011, the IJ considered Syblis's controlled 
substances arguments to determine his eligibility under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(h).  The IJ concluded that both of Syblis's 
convictions – for possession of drug paraphernalia and 
possession of marijuana – related to "controlled substances" 
                                              
2
 Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) of Title 8 of the United 
States Code renders deportable "[a]ny alien who at any time 
after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any 
law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance (as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense 
involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana . . . ."). 
3
 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), the "Attorney General 
may, in his discretion, waive [a finding of inadmissibility] as 
it relates to a single offense of simple possession of 30 grams 
or less of marijuana . . . ."  
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for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
4
  Because 
Syblis had two convictions that related to controlled 
substances, instead of only one, the IJ found him ineligible 
for a waiver of criminal inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(h).  The IJ pretermitted Syblis's application for an 
adjustment of status, and ordered him removed from the 
United States to Jamaica.   
Syblis appealed the IJ's determination of ineligibility to 
the BIA.  Because Syblis conceded removability under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(b), the BIA declined to reach the merits 
on his challenge to the IJ's decision to sustain the removal 
charge concerning 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  In analyzing 
the IJ's denial of Syblis's request for relief, the BIA first 
observed that Syblis had the burden of demonstrating his 
eligibility for relief under the waiver statute.  It then 
acknowledged that Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 punished 
paraphernalia offenses potentially related to controlled 
substances included within the Controlled Substances Act 
(the "CSA"), such as methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and 
opium-substances, and those not included within the CSA, 
such as those recognized by the official United States 
Pharmacopoeia National Formulary.  The BIA based its 
ultimate conclusion on the fact that Syblis had not 
"meaningfully demonstrated" that his conviction fell into the 
latter category.  (App. at 5).  Because Syblis's convictions – 
both the paraphernalia offense and the marijuana offense – 
                                              
4
 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) renders inadmissible 
"any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or 
who admits committing acts which constitute the essential 
elements of . . . a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to 
violate) any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21)." 
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appeared to relate to controlled substances, and Syblis had not 
made any specific proffer otherwise, the BIA affirmed the IJ's 
conclusion that he was statutorily ineligible for a waiver of 
inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 
This timely petition for review followed. 
II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
The BIA had jurisdiction to review the IJ's order of 
removal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  This Court's 
jurisdiction arises under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
5
   
"When the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, 
rather than a summary affirmance, we review its decision, not 
that of the IJ."  Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att'y Gen., 671 F.3d 
303, 310 (3d Cir. 2011).  "We review legal determinations de 
novo, subject to the principals of deference articulated in 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984)."  Id.   
III.  Analysis 
"An alien applying for relief or protection from 
removal has the burden of proof to establish that the alien [] 
satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements."  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i); see Jean-Louis v. Att'y Gen., 582 F.3d 
                                              
5
 While jurisdiction to review removal orders issued 
against noncitizens convicted of certain crimes is generally 
precluded by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), this jurisdiction 
stripping only applies where the noncitizen is found to be 
removable on the basis of the criminal conviction.  The 
jurisdiction-stripping provision does not apply in the instant 
context, however, because the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision 
only as to Syblis's removability based upon the overstay 
statute.   
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462, 464 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) ("An alien bears the burden of 
establishing his eligibility for discretionary cancellation of 
removal.").  "If the evidence indicates that one or more of the 
grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may 
apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not 
apply."  8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).   
 As previously noted, § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) renders 
inadmissible "any alien convicted of . . . a violation of . . . any 
law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance (as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21)."  8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  And § 1182(h) provides for a waiver of 
that finding of inadmissibility, where the alien has been 
convicted of only "a single offense of simple possession of 30 
grams or less of marijuana."  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (emphasis 
added).  Here, Syblis has two convictions that potentially 
relate to controlled substances under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) – 
his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia under Va. 
Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 and his conviction for possession of 
marijuana under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-250.1.  He has chosen 
to argue that Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 does not relate to 
controlled substances under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  If Syblis 
is correct, he may be eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility 
under § 1182(h) because he will have only been convicted of 
one law relating to a controlled substance.
6
   
 We are thus faced with the question of whether Syblis 
has adequately met his burden of demonstrating his eligibility 
for relief.  To meet this burden, Syblis must affirmatively 
demonstrate either: (1) that Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 is not 
                                              
6
 Syblis would still need to demonstrate that his 
November 30, 2004 conviction for possession of marijuana 
involved 30 grams or less of marijuana.   
  
9 
a law relating to a controlled substance; or (2) that the 
controlled substance involved in his conviction was not 
defined by federal law.  See Rojas v. Attorney General, 728 
F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (analyzing a 
substantively identical statute to determine the government's 
burden in a removal proceeding).
7
   
 In his petition for review, Syblis argues that he has met 
this burden.
8
  He argues that Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 
cannot relate to controlled substances because the range of 
behavior targeted by the statute covers controlled drugs and 
                                              
7
 In Rojas, we analyzed a statute substantively 
identical to the one at issue in this case.  There, the 
government instituted removal proceedings against Rojas, a 
noncitizen, under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which rendered 
deportable "any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation . . . 
relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of 
Title 21) . . .."  Rojas, 728 F.3d at 205.  Given the language of 
the statute, we determined that, in order for the government to 
meet its burden, it had to establish that Rojas: (1) "is an alien 
(2) who at any time after entering the country violated or 
attempted to violate a law relating to a controlled substance 
and (3) that the controlled substance is defined as such by 
federal law."  Id. at 209.  We apply here the same 
construction to the substantively identical language found in 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).   
8
 Syblis initially based his entire argument on the 
assumption that resolution of this case required resort to 
either the formal categorical approach or the modified 
categorical approach.  However, at oral argument, he 
conceded that, in light of our recent decision in Rojas, those 
arguments are no longer valid. 
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not controlled substances.  Syblis finds this to be a key 
distinction, as the statute defines the terms "drug" and 
"controlled substances" separately.  Because, as he sees it, 
Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 does not relate to controlled 
substances, Syblis contends that our inquiry is at an end, and 
our Court need not reach the question of whether the 
controlled substance involved in his conviction was defined 
by federal law.  Alternatively, however, he argues that, if we 
conclude that Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 does meet the 
"relating to" portion of the analysis, he has still met his 
burden because his record of conviction is silent as to the type 
of substance involved in his offense.      
A. 
We begin with a discussion of whether Va. Code Ann. 
§ 54.1-3466 relates to "controlled substances" for purposes of 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  In Rojas, we acknowledged 
"a parallel but distinct line of cases . . . developed to address 
situations in which the relevant federal conduct is presented 
not as a generic, unitary crime but as a conviction 'relating to' 
other crimes or objects."  728 F.3d at 217.  Analysis of those 
cases does not require a strict element-by-element match 
between the federal and state statutes as required by the 
categorical approach.
9
  See id. at 217 n.15 (noting that many 
cases deciding whether a statute "relates to" controlled 
substances involve statutes of conviction that have no exact 
federal analog, making impossible the comparison of 
elements that the categorical approach requires).  Rather, "the 
                                              
9
 The categorical approach is typically "used to 
ascertain whether a prior conviction 'fits' the definition of a 
generic federal predicate offense for purposes of certain 
immigration or sentencing consequences."  Rojas, 728 F.3d at 
214.   
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inquiry focuses on the nature of the defendant's conviction, 
and whether it 'stand[s] in relation,' 'pertain[s],' has 'bearing of 
concern,' or 'refer[s]' to the object or crime of comparison."  
Id. at 217 (quoting Desai v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 762, 764 (7th 
Cir. 2008)).  This inquiry hones in on the expansive scope 
generally accorded the "relating to" language.  See, e.g., 
Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) 
("Congress's use of the phrase 'relating to' in federal 
legislation generally signals its expansive intent."); Denis v. 
Atty. Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying the 
phrase "relating to" broadly); Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 
915 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing that the Ninth Circuit has 
previously construed the "relating to" language broadly).      
In order to determine whether Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-
3466 relates to controlled substances for purposes of § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), we must, therefore, "survey the 
interrelationship between" Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 and 
federally-defined controlled substances, "and apply the phrase 
relating to broadly, seeking a logical or causal connection."  
Denis, 633 F.3d at 212 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  We find that this test 
is easily met here.   
The statute specifically states:    
. . . [I]t shall be a misdemeanor 
for any person to possess or 
distribute controlled 
paraphernalia which shall mean a 
hypodermic syringe, needle or 
other instrument or 
implementation or combination 
thereof adapted for the 
administration of controlled 
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dangerous substances by 
hypodermic injections . . . . under 
circumstances which reasonably 
indicate an intention to use such 
controlled paraphernalia for 
purposes of illegally 
administering any controlled drug, 
or gelatin capsules, glassine 
envelopes or any other container 
suitable for the packaging of 
individual quantities of controlled 
drugs in sufficient quantity to and 
under circumstances which 
reasonably indicate an intention to 
use any such item for the illegal 
manufacture, distribution, or 
dispensing of any such controlled 
drug. 
 
Va. Code Ann. tit. 54.1 - 3466 (emphasis added).  The statute 
defines "controlled substance" as any "drug, substance, or 
immediate precursor in Schedules I through VI . . . .," listing, 
for example, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, peyote, and 
opium-substances.  See Va. Code Ann. tit. 54.1 – 3401, §§ 
3446-55.  The substances listed in Schedules I through VI are 
covered, at least in part, by the CSA.   
 Syblis argues, however, that the "underlying element" 
of Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 refers to only the use of 
controlled drugs and not controlled substances.  (Petitioner's 
Opening Br. at 9).  It is on this distinction that Syblis bases 
his argument that Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 does not relate 
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to controlled substances.  He directs our attention to the fact 
that the term "drug" is defined separately in the statute as: 
 (i) articles or substances 
recognized in the official United 
States Pharmacopoeia National 
Formulary or official 
Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of 
the United States, or any 
supplement to any of them; (ii) 
articles or substances intended for 
use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease in man or 
animals; (iii) articles or 
substances, other than food, 
intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body of man 
or animals; (iv) articles or 
substances intended for use as a 
component of any article specified 
in clause (i), (ii), or (iii); or (v) a 
biological product. 
 
Va. Code Ann. tit. 54.1 – 3401.  He argues that this definition 
of the term "drug" mirrors the language of a statute we 
examined in Borrome v. Attorney General, 687 F.3d 150, 163 
(3d Cir. 2012), where we concluded that certain provisions of 
the statute did not relate to controlled substances.  Syblis 
argues that we should reach the same conclusion here.  We 
disagree.  This case concerns neither the same situation nor 
the same statute as in Borrome.  There, we examined the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the "FDCA") to determine 
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whether it was a law relating to controlled substances.  A 
significant point of distinction here is that the FDCA is not a 
drug paraphernalia statute.  On that point alone we are 
justified in disregarding that case for purposes of our analysis.   
 We decline to dismiss Borrome so quickly, however, 
as that case brings to the forefront major flaws in Syblis's 
argument.  Despite Syblis's contentions, the fact that the 
remaining portion of Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 refers to 
"drugs" bears little on our analysis as to whether the statute 
"'stand[s] in relation,' 'pertain[s],' has 'bearing of concern,' or 
'refer[s]' to" controlled substances.  Rojas, 728 F.3d at 217 
(quoting Desai, 520 F.3d at 764).  We made this point in 
Borrome:  
[A] law need not require for its 
violation the actual involvement 
of a controlled substance in order 
to relate to a controlled substance.  
If Congress wanted a one-to-one 
correspondence between the [laws 
of conviction] and the federal 
CSA, it would have used a word 
like "involving" instead of 
"relating to" . . . .  In this vein, the 
BIA and several of our sister 
Courts of Appeals have held that a 
law prohibiting the possession or 
use of drug paraphernalia is a law 
relating to a controlled substance.   
 
687 F.3d at 160 (alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Syblis's construction of Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 
cuts too narrowly for purposes of the "relating to" analysis 
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and, rather than construe the language of the statute broadly, 
invites us to revert back to the element-by-element analysis 
that we rejected in Rojas.  728 F.3d at 215 (stating that the 
formal categorical approach would not apply to a "relating to" 
inquiry).  We decline that invitation.   
 The basis for our conclusion in Borrome further 
demonstrates the error in Syblis's arguments.  We concluded 
"that the FDCA prohibits 'countless activities that are 
completely unconnected to controlled substances'" and that 
"the connection between the substances listed in the CSA and 
those at issue in the FDCA was 'not at all evident from the 
face of [the statute].'"  Rojas, 728 F.3d at 218 (quoting 
Borrome, 687 F.3d at 162).  That is clearly not the case here.  
Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 is plainly intended to criminalize 
behavior involving the possession or distribution of various 
substances – at least some of which are covered by the federal 
schedules of controlled substances.  This point is 
demonstrated by the statute's use of the term "controlled 
substances" and its coinciding definition.  Further, the statute 
makes clear that an object is not "controlled paraphernalia" 
unless it is in some way linked to substances.  Indeed, the 
statute painstakingly describes the circumstances and intent 
that must be present in order for a conviction to be obtained 
under the statute, all of which relate to the production or use 
of substances that, again, are covered in part by the federal 
schedules of controlled substances.  On this basis, we are 
satisfied that Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 is sufficiently 
connected to controlled substances so as to be "related to" 
controlled substances for purposes of § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  
See Luu-Le, 224 F.3d at 915 ("Although the definition of 
'drug' . . . does not map perfectly the definition of 'controlled 
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substance' . . . in our opinion [the statute] is clearly a law 
'relating to' a controlled substance.'").
10
  
B. 
Because Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3466 relates to 
controlled substances for purposes of § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 
Syblis must prove that the substance involved in his 
conviction was not defined by federal law in order to be 
eligible for relief.  Rojas, 728 F.3d at 209.  Syblis faces an 
additional hurdle at the outset, however, because his record of 
conviction is inconclusive as to the specific substance 
involved.  Our inquiry thus compels us to determine whether 
an inconclusive record of conviction is sufficient to satisfy a 
noncitizen's burden to demonstrate eligibility for relief from 
removal.  For our Court, this question is a matter of first 
impression.    
                                              
10
 Syblis also contends that if we were to read the 
"controlled drugs" requirement in the Virginia statute as 
"controlled substances," we would render meaningless other 
words in the statutory language.  We reject this contention.  
We are not reading "controlled drugs" as "controlled 
substances."  As our analysis indicates, the statute refers to 
both "drugs" and "controlled substances."  Further, the 
portion of the statute to which Syblis directs our attention, 
Va. Code Ann. tit. 18.2-265.3, which he claims is the actual 
statute under which individuals are charged for paraphernalia 
related to controlled substances, is unhelpful to his position as 
well.  That statute, which punishes "person[s] who sell[] or 
possess[] with intent to sell drug paraphernalia," criminalizes 
a completely different act – the sale of, or intent to sell, drug 
paraphernalia. 
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Five other Courts of Appeals have addressed this issue.  
The Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that 
an inconclusive record is insufficient to satisfy a noncitizen's 
burden of proving eligibility for discretionary relief.  See 
Sanchez v. Holder, -- F.3d --, 2014 WL 3329186, at *6 n.6 
(7th Cir. July 9, 2014) (noting that if, in the relief context, 
"the analysis has run its course and the answer is still unclear, 
the alien loses by default"); Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 
990 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (relying on the "statutorily 
prescribed burden of proof" to conclude that a noncitizen 
cannot carry his burden of demonstrating eligibility for 
discretionary relief by merely establishing that record of 
conviction is inconclusive), overruling Sandoval-Lua v. 
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that an 
inconclusive record of conviction satisfies a noncitizen's 
burden of establishing eligibility for discretionary relief); 
accord Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 116 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009).  
Each case relies heavily on the statutorily prescribed burden-
shifting scheme associated with removal proceedings.   
The Fourth Circuit, for example, explained that it is the 
alien's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the inadmissibility ground "do[es] not apply."  Salem, 
647 F.3d at 115 (emphasis added).  With an inconclusive 
record of conviction, "[i]t is equally likely that [the 
noncitizen] was convicted of [the federal crime] as it is that 
he was not."  Id. at 117.  The Tenth Circuit added that, "[t]he 
fact that [the noncitizen] is not to blame for the ambiguity 
surrounding his criminal conviction does not relieve him of 
his obligation to prove eligibility for discretionary relief."  
Garcia, 584 F.3d at 1290.  On that basis, those courts have 
concluded that the noncitizen cannot meet his or her burden 
where the record is inconclusive.   
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The only court to conclude otherwise is the Second 
Circuit, which employed the categorical approach to hold that 
presentation of an inconclusive record of conviction satisfies 
a noncitizen's burden to demonstrate that he has not been 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  See Martinez v. Mukasey, 
551 F.3d 113, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2008).  The court placed 
significant emphasis on the statute's use of the word 
"conviction," and focused on the practical difficulties 
presented by failure to confine the relief inquiry in 
accordance with strictures of the categorical approach.  Id. at 
122.  We have already determined above that the categorical 
approach does not apply to the case before us today.  It is, 
therefore, unnecessary for us to reconcile that approach with 
the language of the statute at issue here.  A more noteworthy 
distinction between the Second Circuit's decision and that of 
the Fourth, Ninth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, however, is 
the Second Circuit's lack of emphasis on the noncitizen's 
burden in the relief context.
 11
  See, e.g., Salem, 647 F.3d at 
                                              
11
 Following oral argument, the Immigrant Defense 
Project (the "IDP") requested leave to file as amicus curiae a 
letter in support of petitioner.  We granted that motion.  In 
that letter, the IDP asserts that the question of whether a 
noncitizen is ineligible for relief based upon a prior 
conviction is a legal inquiry – rather than factual – as to 
which the burden of proof has no relevance.  We disagree 
with IDPs contention regarding the burden of proof.  Courts 
cannot arrive at legal conclusions in a context such as this 
without considering the underlying facts.  Our analysis of a 
noncitizen's burden in this context merely assists us in 
arriving at a legal conclusion, that is, the determination of 
whether an inconclusive record of conviction is sufficient to 
satisfy a noncitizens' burden of proving eligibility for 
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119 (criticizing Martinez for dismissing the "clear statutory 
language" establishing the noncitizen's burden in the relief 
context, and rejecting use of the categorical approach in such 
a context as well).  
It is clear from the relevant statutory text that the 
government bears the burden of establishing removability.   
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).  Once the government has met 
its burden, the noncitizen then bears the burden of 
establishing his eligibility for discretionary cancellation of 
removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i).  To relieve either 
party of their burden would "effectively nullif[y] the 
statutorily prescribed burden of proof."  See Garcia, 584 F.3d 
at 1290.  The Second Circuit's holding does just that.  For that 
reason, we reject the holding of the Second Circuit, and align 
our case law with that of the Fourth, Ninth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits.  We now hold that an inconclusive record of 
                                                                                                     
discretionary relief.          
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conviction does not satisfy a noncitizen's burden of 
demonstrating eligibility for relief from removal.
12
     
We now turn to the merits.  Here, there is no question 
that Syblis is removable.  Indeed, he conceded the point.  The 
burden then shifted to Syblis to prove the absence of any 
impediment to discretionary relief.  To do so, Syblis had to 
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
substance involved in his conviction did not involve a 
federally-defined controlled substance.  A burden of proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence "requires the trier of fact to 
believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its 
nonexistence."  Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. 
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 
(1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Accordingly, the burden establishes "which party loses if the 
                                              
12
 Syblis argues that Thomas v. Attorney General, 625 
F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2010), counsels in favor of a different 
result.  See id. at 147 (because the record was silent as to 
whether the noncitizen sold or exchanged marijuana, court 
could not definitively conclude that his conviction for 
criminal sale of marijuana constituted drug trafficking crime 
that qualified as aggravated felony).  He asserts that Thomas 
stands for the proposition that when a record of conviction 
does not establish that a particular element of a crime was 
necessarily found by the convicting court, the alien meets his 
burden of proving that the provision precluding relief from 
removal does not apply.  We reject this argument and 
Thomas's application to the instant context.  In Thomas, our 
inquiry required resort to the categorical approach, which we 
have expressly rejected here.  That opinion also lacks any 
discussion of a noncitizen's burden of proving eligibility for 
discretionary relief.   
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evidence is closely balanced."  Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. 
Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005).  Here, Syblis has only 
demonstrated that the record is inconclusive – that his 
conviction for paraphernalia possession may or may not be 
related to a federally controlled substance.  This 
demonstration shows only that "the evidence is closely 
balanced" and fails to show "that the existence of a fact is 
more probable than its nonexistence."  We conclude that this 
is insufficient to meet his burden of proving eligibility for 
relief.  Syblis is, therefore, not entitled to cancellation of 
removal. 
IV.  Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, we will deny Syblis's 
petition for review. 
